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1. Introduction  
Quantifying individual expectations has become a very important topic in economics, 
both for academic researchers and for policymakers. One of the most relevant advantage 
of collecting probabilistic expectations is that the quantitative answers can be used to 
compare predictions across different agents and time, as well as to analyse their 
consistency. 
As the majority of models of exchange rate determination in a context of open economy 
are based on the assumption of rationality expectations, it is important to analyze how 
exchange rate expectations are formed. Jongen et al. (2008) emphasize the relevance of 
exchange rate expectations for many issues such as the forward discount puzzle, the 
heterogeneity of expectations, time-varying risk premium, the rationality of expectations 
and the accuracy of professional forecasts. Given that the assumption of rational 
expectations is crucial to evaluate the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies, this paper 
focuses on the rationality and the predictive accuracy of macroeconomic expectations 
made by participants in the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) conducted by the 
European Central Bank (ECB). 
Since Muth (1961), there are two conventional ways to test rationality of survey-based 
expectations: on the one hand, it is needed to analyse the forecast unbiasedness and on 
the other hand, the orthogonality of forecasts. The first method is related to investigate 
whether the expected exchange rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate, while 
the second test assesses whether the panellists incorporate all available information until 
the moment they are asked about their expectations. It can be possible that the exchange 
rate expectations are biased, nevertheless this does not necessarily imply that forecasters 
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form irrational predictions. A rejection of the unbiasedness hypothesis can be rational in 
the presence of the peso problem, heterogeneous expectations or adaptive learning.  
The vast majority of empirical studies finds evidence of irrationality in the exchange rate 
expectations and show low forecasting ability (see, Dominguez, 1986); Takagi, 1991; 
Cavaglia et al., 1993; or MacDonald and Marsh, 1994; among others). 
Given that most of studies have focused on large advanced countries forecasts, such as 
the United States (US) and other Group of Seven (G-7) countries (see for instance, Isiklar 
et al., 2006 or Dovern and Weisser, 2011), Ince and Molodtsova (2015) evaluate the 
rationality and forecasting accuracy of exchange rate expectations at 3-, 12- and 24-
months ahead forecast horizons over the last two decades using a sample of 10 developed 
and 24 developing countries’ currencies. They obtain that survey-based predictions are 
biased at 3-months ahead forecast horizon for all developed countries and for the vast 
majority of developing countries. Although this bias is eliminated for 12- and 24-months 
ahead for developed economies, there is no statistical significance reduction for 
developing countries. Ince and Molodtsova (2016) conclude that long-term forecasts are 
more accurate than short-run forecasts. Some papers such as La Porta (1996) or Bergman 
and Roychowdhury (2008) emphasize the role of cyclicality in the process in which 
expectations are built. They contend that agents are excessively optimistic in good times 
and extremely pessimistic in bad times, underestimating long-run mean reversion. In 
other words, they overestimate the persistence of economic conditions (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2007). In the same line, Hribar and McInnis (2012) find that stocks prices 
receive optimistic earnings forecasts when investor’s sentiment is high. To determine the 
average belief form individual agents, it is important to take into account that pro-cyclical 
optimism in aggregate expectations does not imply that individual predictions are 
irrational. In fact, Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006) and Patton and Timmermann 
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(2010) state that even if individual investors were rational, the aggregation of expectations 
leads to sub-optimal or irrational average beliefs. Using a closed-form general 
equilibrium model, Marfè (2015) study the investors’ expectations of fundamentals with 
market returns and suggest that the pro-cyclical optimism can explain the persistence of 
aggregate risk.  
Bakhshi et al.(2003) also test the rational expectations hypothesis using prediction of fund 
managers in which respondents are asked to forecast “fixed-event” inflation (i.e, every 
month panellists are asked about predictions of the annual inflation rate for the same data). 
In their paper, respondents must predict inflation rate for two years ahead and the 
following month they offer the new expectation for the same date (at this moment 
prediction refers to one year and eleven months ahead), and so on. Their findings suggest 
that forecasts are biased, although Bakhshi et al. (2003) stress that this is not itself 
indicative of irrational expectations. Besides they analyse efficiency in three ways: first, 
they test whether forecast errors are not correlated with past revisions, finding some 
evidence of inefficiency; second, they test if forecast revisions are not autocorrelated , 
obtaining less evidence of inefficiency; and finally, they test if the variance of forecast 
errors decreases once we are closer to the inflation outturn, indicating that the sample size 
is too small to be sure about efficiency.  
There are some papers in which they stress how inflation expectations contribute to the 
inflation generating process. In particular, Ang et al. (2007) and Faust and Wright (2013) 
emphasize the utility of survey-based measures of inflation predictions and show 
evidence about how survey forecast tend to perform best when it is compared with 
different inflation forecasting methods. In the same vein, Gil-Alana et al. (2012) claim 
that survey-based expectations are better to explain the future inflation rate rather than 
usual time series models. In contrast, Bauer and McCarthy (2015) suggest that financ ia l 
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markets only provide scarce forward-looking information to predict future information, 
since market-based inflation forecasts are not more accurate than survey-based forecasts. 
Given that in the literature there is not consensus about which of both methods 
outperform, Grothe and Meyler (2015) try to fill this gap analysing market-based and 
survey-based measures of inflation predictions for the euro area and for the US, 
concluding that both have a non-negligible predictive power for inflation. 
Trying to evaluate whether the accuracy of European Commission forecasts have changed 
during the Global Financial Crisis with respect to the period before it, González 
Cabanillas and Terzi (2012) examine six variables: real gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth, inflation, general government balance, the unemployment rate, current account 
and total investment. A significant deterioration of the accuracy of year-ahead 
expectations is detected due to larger forecast errors in the recession year 2009. They 
suggest the role of the interest-rate assumptions and the assumption of unchanged fiscal 
policy as the main explanatory variables to explain the observed forecast errors. 
Heilemann and Stekler (2007) do not find a high improvement in forecasts accuracy when 
they study the inflation and real GDP growth forecast in Germany during the last ten 
years. 
Since some Asian economies have transitioned from low/middle income to middle/high 
income, Chen et al. (2016) examine whether this progress has contributed to improve 
forecast performance over the years, concluding that there is no evidence that these 
predictions have improved over the last years. Chen et al. (2016) report large forecast 
errors for both GDP and inflation series in the most countries and forecasters. In terms of 
directional changes, GDP growth predictions are found to be more accurate and unbiased 
for about half of countries and with respect to the hypothesis that forecasters incorporate 
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new information efficiently, it is rejected for GDP growth expectations with only some 
marginal evidence for the inflation rate. 
In the context of stock prices, Walther and Willis (2012) conclude that market 
participants’ expectations about firm’s future payoffs may explain stock mispricing due 
to the fact that the sentiment effects determine the accuracy of forecasts of short term 
payoffs. Miwa (2015) shows that long term earning growth expectations are also cruc ial 
to stock price evaluations indicating that with sentiment indices it can be controlled an 
excess of optimism or pessimism in the market and could reduce the irrational effect on 
asset pricing. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data used in the 
analysis. Empirical results are presented in Section 3 and, finally, some concluding 
remarks are provided in Section 4. 
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2. Data  
The ECB offers forecasts related to different macroeconomic indicators along several 
time horizons. More specifically, this survey has the advantage of analyzing an integrated 
macroeconomic perspective since it reflects the expectations about real economic growth, 
inflation and unemployment rates. In this particular case, the SPF considers the infla t ion 
rate as the year on year percentage change of the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices 
(HICP); the real GDP is defined as the year on year percentage change of the real GDP 
using the standardized ESA definition and finally, the unemployment rate refers to the 
ratio between the number of unemployed with respect to the labour force.  
Since 1999 this SPF has been conducted quarterly. This survey collects responses from 
financial and other institutions from around the European Union. It is usually based on 
approximately 75 professional forecasters with an average of 60 respondents who 
participate in each round. 
In the ECB SPF there are two types of observations: point forecasts and probability 
distribution forecasts. In the first case, forecasters are asked to provide a point forecast or 
a single value with respect to the previous mentioned variables at different horizons time. 
Sometimes it is convenient to obtain limits between which the true parameter is found 
with a certain confidence interval. For this reason, in this paper the probability distribution 
of forecasted outcomes is also considered. In this second case, forecasters are asked to 
report the probability distribution along a set of intervals for each time horizon. It is 
needed to emphasize that this set of intervals is different between the previous indicators 
and is subject to revisions along the survey adapting to different circumstances.  
These panellists usually update their forecasts following data releases or other events 
(such as financial crisis) and some of them confirm that may also update them because of 
significant shocks. It is also important to mention that large panel assures good data 
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quality compared to other surveys in which researchers study the behaviour of infla t ion 
rates. 
Due to the ten-year anniversary of the SPF, the ECB sent to the participants a special 
questionnaire to analyze whether the forecasts are judgement-based or model-based. In 
this survey they consider different models such as autoregressive integrated moving 
average (ARIMA), single equation, vector auto regression (VAR), vector error correction 
(VEC), factors models, traditional supply and demand-based macro models and dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models.  
This special survey identifies on the one hand that time series models are more common 
to predict the behaviour of inflation rates and also to form expectations for shorter-term 
horizons. On the other hand, it is shown that respondents implement more traditiona l 
supply and demand-based macroeconomic models for longer-term time horizons and 
slightly more for the real economic growth rate and unemployment rate. 
On average, respondents consider their forecasts to be 40% judgement-based. They 
emphasize that there is no statistical differences across variables or horizons, except for 
inflation. The short-run inflation forecasts are predicted using judgement-based around 
37%, increasing for longer-time horizons, rather than unemployment and real growth 
which weight slightly more in its expectations. Furthermore, on average, panellists use 
judgement-based in higher proportion in order to predict unemployment rate rather than 
real economic growth rate and there is no significant differences in terms of time horizons.  
3. Empirical results  
In this section, we successively report our empirical results for inflation rate expectations 
(3.1), unemployment rate expectations (3.2) and real economic growth rate expectations 
(3.3). 
  
8 
 
3.1. Inflation rates 
In order to evaluate the forecasting performance of the ECB SPF panel regarding the 
inflation expectations, we consider the root mean square error (RMSE) and the Theil 
inequality coefficient. Besides, it has been analyzed how far the mean of the predictions 
is from the mean of the actual series, how far the variance of the forecast is from the 
variation of the actual inflation rates and finally, how large is the remaining unsystematic 
forecasting errors, that is decomposing the RMSE into the bias proportion, the variance 
and the covariance proportion, respectively. 
 
Table 1 reports the forecast accuracy for different time horizons (3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21 
and 24 months ahead) for the headline and core inflation. Analyzing the headline infla t ion 
(Panel A of Table 1), the RMSE is high and increases with the time horizon, mainly from 
15 months ahead. In the same vein, Theil's inequality coefficient is far from zero, 
indicating both indicators that economic agents make errors in their predictions and make 
it worse as we move away along the time horizon. Regarding the bias proportion, the 
average of predictions performed is practically the same as the average of the actual series 
of headline inflation rates observed over the time period since their values are very close 
to zero. According to the results obtained for the variance proportion, it seems that the 
panellists are able to replicate the degree of variability of the headline inflation rate the 
closer they are to the date of the survey (k = 3, 6 and 9) , because from 12-months ahead 
and especially from 15-months ahead begin to adopt higher values. At least up to k = 12, 
most of the bias is concentrated on the covariance proportion, thus indicating that ECB 
panellists make non-deterministic errors. 
Comparing the results of Panels A and B of Table 1, it is evident that respondents are able 
to predict with more accuracy core inflation than headline inflation, since the values of 
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both RMSE and Theil inequality coefficient are significantly minors in any time horizon 
studied. Until k = 12, panellists are able to replicate perfectly both the central position 
measurement and the degree of variability of the observed series of core inflation (see 
bias proportion and variance proportion, respectively). This means that errors made when 
they should predict the behaviour of core inflation rates for the next 3, 6, 9 and 12 months 
ahead are unsystematic, an opposite situation occurs when they should predict from 15 
months ahead in which the errors made are not random (the bias proportion values are 
reduced but the variance proportion acquires a greater weight in the decomposition of the 
mean squared forecast error).  
All in all, our findings suggest that the predictive ability is much higher for core infla t ion 
than for headline inflation. This may be related to the fact that, as in the core inflation the 
evolution of more volatile prices related to energy products and unprocessed food are not 
considered, it could be easier for the panellists to make their predictions more accurately.  
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Table 1: Forecast accuracy 
Panel A: Headline inflation 
 RMSE Theil 
inequality 
coefficient 
Bias 
proportion 
Variance 
proportion 
Covariance 
proportion 
3-month ahead 0.6481 0.1645 0.0205 0.0067 0.9728 
6-month ahead 0.7130 0.1821 0.0212 0.0140 0.9648 
9-month ahead 0.6833 0.1740 0.0083 0.0494 0.9422 
12-month ahead 0.6930 0.1766 0.0003 0.1848 0.8149 
15-month ahead 0.8942 0.2313 0.0008 0.4078 0.5914 
18-month ahead 0.9407 0.2448 0.0034 0.3348 0.6618 
21-month ahead 0.9036 0.2340 0.0004 0.5164 0.4832 
24-month ahead 0.9301 0.2417 0.0007 0.5768 0.4226 
Panel B: Core inflation 
 RMSE Theil 
inequality 
coefficient 
Bias 
proportion 
Variance 
proportion 
Covariance 
proportion 
3-month ahead 0.4543 0.1372 0.0775 0.1012 0.8213 
6-month ahead 0.4460 0.1345 0.0673 0.0810 0.8516 
9-month ahead 0.4324 0.1303 0.0392 0.0239 0.9369 
12-month ahead 0.4041 0.1215 0.0068 0.0186 0.9746 
15-month ahead 0.5266 0.1571 0.0011 0.2427 0.7562 
18-month ahead 0.5714 0.1712 0.0043 0.1683 0.8274 
21-month ahead 0.5276 0.1574 0.0001 0.3886 0.6113 
24-month ahead 0.5502 0.1645 0.0002 0.4757 0.5241 
 
In order to assess whether ECB respondents are predicting more accurately than a random 
walk, Table 2 shows the results of the percentage of correct predictions about the direction 
of change in both headline and core inflation. The reason to analyse the accuracy of the 
direction of changes is because some important papers point out the relevance of doing 
well for investors and policymakers (see for instance, Altavilla and De Grauwe, 2010 or 
Bergmeir et al., 2014, among others). In both cases, our results provide suffic ient 
empirical evidence to confirm that the predictions of these economic agents are better 
than those from a random walk. It should be noted that when the headline inflation is 
examined, the highest correct prediction percentages are associated to the following time 
horizons: k = 12, 15 and 18, reaching their maximum in k = 12 (82.35%). 
With respect to the core inflation, respondents generally show a greater capacity to predict 
whether prices for the next period will rise or fall. In particular, in all the temporal 
horizons it surpasses the 60% of success rate. As in the case of headline inflation, the 
most significant success percentages are in k = 15 and 18 (81.25% in both), reaching their 
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maximum when they need to predict the direction of the inflation rate for the next 6 
months ahead (82.35%). The smallest success percentages are the farthest from the 
present, that is, for k = 21 and 24 (75% in both), reaching their minimum in k = 12 
(64.71%). 
Table 2: Directional forecast 
Panel A: Headline inflation 
3-month ahead 58.82 
6-month ahead 70.59 
9-month ahead 58.83 
12-month ahead 82.35 
15-month ahead 75.00 
18-month ahead 68.75 
21-month ahead 62.50 
24-month ahead 62.50 
Panel B: Core inflation 
3-month ahead 76.47 
6-month ahead 82.35 
9-month ahead 76.47 
12-month ahead 64.71 
15-month ahead 81.25 
18-month ahead 81.25 
21-month ahead 75.00 
24-month ahead 75.00 
 
 
To check the robustness of the accuracy of the ECB’s predictions, we test the hypothesis 
that the panel forecasts are optimal predictors of future headline and core inflation rates. 
The rational expectations hypothesis does not imply that the panellist do not make any 
error in any time horizon but requires that the forecast errors must be unbiased and 
uncorrelated with any information in which the forecast is conditioned (Clements, 2005). 
For this reason, in order to verify if these panellists made predictions unbiased and 
efficient, we consider the following regression of the observed inflation rate at time t+k ( 
𝜋𝑡+𝑘) on the expected rate determined at time t for k periods ahead (𝜋𝑡+𝑘
𝑒 ): 
𝜋𝑡+𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝜋𝑡+𝑘
𝑒 + 𝜀𝑡+𝑘      (1) 
Therefore to obtain evidence of rational expectations hypothesis it should result an 
estimated constant (𝛼) not significantly different form zero and an estimated coefficient 
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on the expected inflation rate (?̂?) not significantly different from one. If this hypothes is 
is not fulfilled, Grant and Thomas (1999) conclude the existence of “weak form of 
rationality”. 
Table 3 and Table 4 present the estimation results and the Wald test on the joint 
hypothesis: 𝐻0: 𝛼 = 0, ?̂? = 1 for the headline and core inflation, respectively. Regardless 
of the time horizon analysed, there is enough empirical evidence to reject this null 
hypothesis for both headline inflation and core inflation. This shows that the predictions 
made by panellists are biased and inefficient. This means that the rational expectations 
hypothesis is not fulfilled, but that the "weak form of rationality" is verified in any time 
horizon. 
Table 3: Forecast optimality (headline inflation) 
 3-month ahead 6-month ahead 9-month ahead 12-month ahead 
 0.6185 
(0.0000) 
0.7983 
(0.0000) 
0.8863 
(0.0000) 
0.9464 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6616 
 (0.0000) 
0.5591 
(0.0000) 
0.5627 
(0.1611) 
0.5619 
(0.0000) 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Wald F-test 114.1240 
(0.0000) 
143.3383 
(0.0000) 
141.4985 
 (0.0000) 
136.4759 
(0.0000) 
No. of 
observations 
1006 899 970 998 
Notes: p-values in parenthesis 
 
 15-month ahead 18-month ahead 21-month ahead 24-month ahead 
 1.4537 
(0.0000) 
1.7034 
(0.0000) 
1.7398 
(0.0000) 
1.7479 
(0.0000) 
 
0.2279 
(0.0000) 
0.0701 
(0.1445) 
0.0743 
(0.1177) 
0.0567 
(0.0000) 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.1445 0.1177 0.0000 
Wald F-test 136.0597 
 (0.0000) 
191.2779 
 (0.0000) 
200.6618 
 (0.0000) 
2471.757 
(0.0000) 
No. of 
observations 
938 836 889 906 
Notes: p-values in parenthesis 
 
Table 4: Forecast optimality (core inflation) 
 3-month ahead 6-month ahead 9-month ahead 12-month ahead 
 0.7810 
(0.0000) 
0.8196 
(0.0000) 
0.9057 
(0.0000) 
0.9460 
(0.0000) 
 
0.4422 
(0.0000) 
0.4243 
(0.0000) 
0.4109 
(0.0000) 
0.4056 
(0.0000) 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
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Wald F-test 1126.802 
(0.0000) 
950.7270 
(0.0000) 
671.1242 
(0.0000) 
412.6461 
(0.0000) 
No. of 
observations 
1006 899 970 998 
Notes: p-values in parenthesis 
 
 15-month ahead 18-month ahead 21-month ahead 24-month ahead 
 1.2460 
(0.0000) 
1.4024 
(0.0000) 
1.4159 
(0.0000) 
1.5881 
(0.0000) 
 
0.2276 
(0.0000) 
0.1257 
(0.0000) 
0.1371 
(0.0000) 
0.0274 
(0.0012) 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0012 
Wald F-test 361.5924 
(0.0000) 
467.0063 
(0.0000) 
434.2251 
(0.0000) 
6872.099 
(0.0000) 
No. of 
observations 
938 836 889 906 
Notes: p-values in parenthesis 
 
 
To ensure that the expectations are rational one necessary requirement is the consistency, 
but is weaker than rationality, the reason is that in this case is not required that the 
prediction process match the stochastic process generating the actual series. Following 
Froot and Ito (1989), consistency of expectations built at the same moment in time 
dominate if we obtain the same result when we compare the expectation about the 
inflation rate for the entire time period with the expectations about inflation rate changes 
during shorter time periods. 
We assume the same model used by Frankel and Froot (1987a, b) and Frenkel et al. (2012) 
in which the panellists build their expectations using an extrapolative model which can, 
in its simplest form, be expressed as a distributed lag function with one lag: 
𝐸𝑡,𝑖(𝜋𝑡+𝑘 ) − 𝜋𝑡 = 𝛼𝑘 + 𝛽𝑘(𝜋𝑡−1 − 𝜋𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡,𝑖       (2) 
 
where 𝜋𝑡 and 𝐸𝑡,𝑖(𝜋𝑡+𝑘 ) denote, respectively, the unemployment rate at t and the expected 
unemployment rate for t+k of forecaster i at time t. Subscript k denotes the forecast 
horizon and 𝜀  the error term. 
 
ˆ
ˆ
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Taking into account that in each quarter respondents are asked about the predictions of 
two different time periods, the first one is considered as the short term and the second 
time horizon as the long term. In particular, in the first quarter, they are inquired about 
the headline and core inflation rate for the next 12 and 24 months, whereby k = 12 is 
considered the prediction for the short term and k = 24 the prediction for the long term. 
In the second quarter, the expectations for 9 (short term) and 21 months ahead (long term) 
are analyzed. Finally, in the third and fourth quarters they are asked for 6 and 18 months 
and for 3 and 15 months, respectively. Examining the estimated betas related to Table 5, 
it is observed that all those associated with the short term (3, 6, 9 and 12) are statistica l ly 
significant and positive, reflecting that the panellists present stabilizing expectations in 
the short term. Continuing with the headline inflation, except for 𝛽15 and 𝛽24 that are 
negative and positive respectively but not significant even getting rid of the constant, in 
general it can be concluded that the estimated betas in the long run are positive, indicat ing 
therefore that in the long run respondents form expectations that are also stabilising. By 
this way, short-term expectations are consistent with long-term expectations. 
Analysing the core inflation (Table 6), except for 𝛽12, that it is not significant, all short-
term estimated betas are statistically significant and positive, implying that short-term 
expectations are stabilizing. Likewise, the long-term expectations are also stabilizing 
(with the exception of 𝛽15 ), for this reason we can conclude that both predictions are 
consistent. 
Table 5: Expectation formation (headline inflation) 
 3-month ahead 6-month ahead 9-month ahead 12-month ahead 
 -0.0083 
(0.5329) 
-0.0373 
(0.0143) 
-0.1611 
(0.0000) 
-0.2321 
(0.0000) 
 
0.8499 
 (0.0000) 
1.2830 
(0.0000) 
0.4689 
(0.0000) 
0.7824 
(0.0000) 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
No. of 
observations 
1006 899 970 998 
Notes: p-values in parenthesis 
ˆ
ˆ
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 15-month ahead 18-month ahead 21-month ahead 24-month ahead 
 -0.2270 
(0.0000) 
-0.2438 
(0.0000) 
-0.2879 
(0.0000) 
0.0595 
(0.4531) 
 
-0.1601 
(0.1798) 
1.8851 
(0.0000) 
0.2187 
(0.0155) 
0.3836 
(0.1711) 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.1798 0.0000 0.0155 0.1711 
No. of 
observations 
938 836 889 906 
Notes: p-values in parenthesis 
 
Table 6: Expectation formation (core inflation) 
 3-month ahead 6-month ahead 9-month ahead 12-month ahead 
 0.2537 
(0.0000) 
0.2309 
(0.0000) 
0.1120 
(0.0000) 
0.0342 
(0.1501) 
 
0.4241 
(0.0107) 
0.5929 
(0.0125) 
0.4606 
(0.0000) 
0.1810 
(0.1671) 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0107 0.0125 0.0000 0.1671 
No. of 
observations 
1006 899 970 998 
Notes: p-values in parenthesis 
 
 15-month ahead 18-month ahead 21-month ahead 24-month ahead 
 0.1119 
(0.0000) 
0.0977 
(0.0010) 
0.0537 
(0.0211) 
0.2849 
(0.0004) 
 
-0.5835 
(0.0020) 
0.5668 
(0.0310) 
0.3560 
(0.0012) 
1.5783 
(0.0003) 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0020 0.0310 0.0012 0.0003 
No. of 
observations 
938 836 889 906 
Notes: p-values in parenthesis 
 
 
3.2. Unemployment rates 
Regarding the expectations on unemployment rates, Table 7 offers some statistical tests 
to evaluate how well ECB respondents form their predictions. As can be seen, they are 
more accurate than those for the inflation rates, at least until to k = 9, since the RMSE 
presents lower values. From k = 15, this indicator begins to experience a slight increase 
in relative terms. According to Theil inequality coefficient, with estimated values so close 
to zero, the panellists do not make such serious errors. Given the disaggregation of the 
RMSE, both the bias proportion and the variance proportion show very small values, thus 
reflecting that the mean and variance of the predictions carried out by the panellists do 
not differ from the mean and variance of the actually observed unemployment rates. Since 
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
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most of the error committed by analysts lies in the covariance proportion, the observed 
deviation between the prediction and the true value of the series is random. 
Table 7: Forecast accuracy  
Unemployment 
 RMSE Theil 
inequality 
coefficient 
Bias 
proportion 
Variance 
proportion 
Covariance 
proportion 
3-month ahead 0.4773 0.0247 0.0046 0.0865 0.9089 
6-month ahead 0.5237 0.0271 0.0052 0.0937 0.9011 
9-month ahead 0.6256 0.0324 0.0048 0.0624 0.9328 
12-month ahead 0.7848 0.0407 0.0048 0.0382 0.9570 
15-month ahead 0.9763 0.0506 0.0052 0.0201 0.9747 
18-month ahead 1.2002 0.0622 0.0090 0.0417 0.9494 
21-month ahead 1.2524 0.0650 0.0078 0.0217 0.9705 
24-month ahead 1.2852 0.0667 0.0067 0.0097 0.9835 
 
 
As the time horizon increases, the percentage of success with respect to the direction of 
changes in the unemployment rate increases, reaching a 50% for 15 and 18 months ahead 
(with the exception of k=21), in fact its maximum is around 56% for the 24 months ahead 
predictions. 
Table 8: Directional forecast 
Unemployment 
3-month ahead 35.29 
6-month ahead 41.18 
9-month ahead 41.18 
12-month ahead 47.06 
15-month ahead 50.00 
18-month ahead 50.00 
21-month ahead 43.75 
24-month ahead 56.25 
 
In order to test if the predictions carried out by this group of analysts are optimal 
predictors of the future unemployment rate of the euro area, it is contrasted if the 
predictions are unbiased and efficient through the following equation: 
𝑢𝑡+𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑢𝑡+𝑘
𝑒 + 𝜀𝑡+𝑘        (3) 
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From Table 9 one can draw the conclusion that predictions are biased and inefficient, 
since the null hypothesis is rejected in all time horizons studied, thus rejecting the 
hypothesis of rational expectations and accepting the "weak form of rationality ". 
Table 9: Forecast optimality (unemployment) 
 3-month ahead 6-month ahead 9-month ahead 12-month ahead 
 1.9233 
(0.0000) 
2.2819 
(0.0000) 
2.5217 
(0.0000) 
3.0494 
(0.0000) 
 
0.8094 
 (0.0000) 
0.7688 
(0.0000) 
0.7415 
(0.0000) 
0.6845 
(0.0000) 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Wald F-test 172.9623 
(0.0000) 
181.2481 
(0.0000) 
169.7855 
(0.0000) 
178.4941 
(0.0000) 
No. of 
observations 
957 879 941 972 
Notes: p-values in parenthesis 
 
 15-month ahead 18-month ahead 21-month ahead 24-month ahead 
 3.5444 
(0.0000) 
4.8344 
(0.0000) 
4.9220 
(0.0000) 
5.2206 
(0.0000) 
 
0.6447 
(0.0000) 
0.5106 
(0.0000) 
0.4991 
(0.0000) 
0.4674 
(0.0000) 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Wald F-test 173.6603 
(0.0000) 
284.0449 
(0.0000) 
258.2844 
(0.0000) 
253.5828 
(0.0000) 
No. of 
observations 
901 822 873 886 
Notes: p-values in parenthesis 
 
 
As in the previous section, here we assume that unemployment forecasters build their 
expectations by using the following extrapolative model: 
𝐸𝑡,𝑖(𝑢𝑡+𝑘 ) − 𝑢𝑡 = 𝛼𝑘 + 𝛽𝑘(𝑢𝑡−1 − 𝑢𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡,𝑖      (4) 
 
where 𝑢𝑡 and 𝐸𝑡,𝑖(𝑢𝑡+𝑘 ) denote, respectively, the unemployment rate at t and the expected 
unemployment rate for t+k of forecaster i at time t. Subscript k denotes the forecast 
horizon and 𝜀  the error term. 
Focusing on the highly significant estimated betas in the short run it can be seen a positive 
estimated sign (Table 10), indicating that, given an increase in the unemployment rate in 
the period prior to the survey, panellists expect an opposite effect for the next period (t + 
ˆ
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k), in which they consider that a reduction in the unemployment rate will occur, thus 
showing stabilizing expectations. Nevertheless, with the exception of 𝛽24, the remainder 
estimated betas for the long term that are significant show a negative estimated sign in 
their estimations. From this result it can be concluded that if analysts observe an increase 
in the unemployment rate at the time before the survey, they will expect that this pattern 
to be maintained for the next period for which they are asked, thus maintaining 
expectations destabilizing. In other words, short-term expectations are not consistent with 
long-term predictions. 
 
Table 10: Expectation formation (unemployment) 
 3-month ahead 6-month ahead 9-month ahead 12-month ahead 
 -0.1355 
(0.0000) 
-0.0813 
(0.0000) 
-0.0911 
(0.0000) 
-0.0625 
(0.0018) 
 
2.7822 
 (0.0000) 
1.2217 
(0.0000) 
0.1557 
(0.3207) 
-0.0117 
(0.6765) 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.3207 0.6765 
No. of 
observations 
957 879 941 912 
Notes: p-values in parenthesis 
 
 15-month ahead 18-month ahead 21-month ahead 24-month ahead 
 -0.1628 
(0.0000) 
-0.1916 
(0.0000) 
-0.2408 
(0.0000) 
-0.2208 
(0.0000) 
 
-1.1161 
(0.0000) 
-0.5577 
(0.1433) 
-1.7508 
(0.0000) 
0.2057 
(0.0000) 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000) 0.1433 0.0000 0.0000 
No. of 
observations 
901 822 873 886 
Notes: p-values in parenthesis 
 
 
3.3. Real economic growth rates 
As for the expectations on real GDP growth, examining Table 11 we notice that, although 
the RMSE is high, unlike inflation rates or the unemployment rate decreases as we move 
forward in the time horizon, especially this decline is highly noticeable from 15 months 
ahead. In this case, the Theil inequality coefficient acts as a complementary indicator to 
the results obtained previously, since the predictive ability of the respondents improves 
ˆ
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from k = 9 and much more significantly from k = 15. Analysts make high errors by trying 
to identify the central position measure of the future real growth rate up to 12 months 
ahead, but from k = 15 the values of this indicator are again close to zero. In general, the 
covariance proportion is also high from k = 15 showing that they make nondeterminis t ic 
errors when they are asked about the predictions for 15, 18, 21 and 24 months ahead. 
 
Table 11: Forecast accuracy  
Real economic growth 
 RMSE Theil 
inequality 
coefficient 
Bias 
proportion 
Variance 
proportion 
Covariance 
proportion 
3-month ahead 1.2748 0.4473 0.5457 0.0571 0.3971 
6-month ahead 1.2606 0.4399 0.5708 0.0689 0.3603 
9-month ahead 1.1005 0.3665 0.4537 0.1070 0.4393 
12-month ahead 0.8585 0.2692 0.2583 0.1169 0.6248 
15-month ahead 0.4833 0.1410 0.0636 0.0510 0.8853 
18-month ahead 0.4295 0.1247 0.0272 0.0056 0.9673 
21-month ahead 0.3964 0.1149 0.0101 0.0034 0.9865 
24-month ahead 0.4116 0.1194 0.0010 0.0720 0.9270 
 
 
As the time horizon increases, it can be seen a higher percentage of success in the 
predictions associated with the direction of expected changes in the variable of interest.  
From k = 12, the percentage of success is greater than 80%, showing that their predictions 
are much more accurate than the random walk. The highest success percentages 
correspond to the predictions for 9 and 21 months ahead (with 94.12% and 93.75%, 
respectively). 
Table 12: Directional forecast 
Real economic growth 
3-month ahead 70.59 
6-month ahead 76.47 
9-month ahead 94.12 
12-month ahead 88.24 
15-month ahead 81.25 
18-month ahead 81.25 
21-month ahead 93.75 
24-month ahead 81.25 
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Besides we assess the hypothesis that the panel forecasts are optimal predictors of future 
real economic growth rates from: 
𝜌𝑡+𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝜌𝑡+𝑘
𝑒 + 𝜀𝑡+𝑘        (5) 
The joint hypothesis in which the estimated constant is zero and the estimated coeffic ient 
of the expected real growth rate for the time horizon to be studied is one is clearly rejected 
in all cases, being able to affirm that the predictions are biased and inefficient. In this way 
there is enough empirical evidence to assure the "weak form of rationality" of the  
predictions made by the ECB's panellists. 
  
  
21 
 
Table 13: Forecast optimality (real economic growth) 
 3-month ahead 6-month ahead 9-month ahead 12-month ahead 
 1.3971 
(0.0000) 
1.3807 
(0.0000) 
1.3324 
(0.0000) 
1.1559 
(0.0000) 
 
0.1698 
 (0.0000) 
0.1863 
(0.0000) 
0.2253 
(0.0000) 
0.3150 
(0.0000) 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Wald F-test 3143.732 
(0.0000) 
3286.728 
(0.0000) 
2410.687 
(0.0000) 
1070.901 
(0.0000) 
No. of 
observations 
1007 902 975 999 
Notes: p-values in parenthesis 
 
 15-month ahead 18-month ahead 21-month ahead 24-month ahead 
 1.0337 
(0.0000) 
0.9312 
(0.0000) 
0.9476 
(0.0000) 
0.9529 
(0.0000) 
 
0.4055 
(0.0000) 
0.4100 
(0.0000) 
0.3913 
(0.0000) 
0.3755 
(0.0000) 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Wald F-test 658.1890 
(0.0000) 
533.8908 
(0.0000) 
590.0444 
(0.0000) 
588.9679 
(0.0000) 
No. of 
observations 
942 839 905 904 
Notes: p-values in parenthesis 
 
 
As in the previous section, here we assume that real economic growth forecasters build 
their expectations by using the following extrapolative model: 
 
𝐸𝑡,𝑖(𝜌𝑡+𝑘 ) − 𝜌𝑡 = 𝛼𝑘 + 𝛽𝑘(𝜌𝑡−1 − 𝜌𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡,𝑖       (6) 
 
where 𝜌𝑡 and 𝐸𝑡,𝑖(𝜌𝑡+𝑘 ) denote, respectively, the real economic growth rate at t and the 
expected  real economic growth rate for t+k of forecaster i at time t. Subscript k denotes 
the forecast horizon and 𝜀  the error term. 
The results of Table 14 suggest that there is not enough empirical evidence to allow us to 
reject the null hypothesis that short-term predictions are consistent with long- term 
predictions. Specifically, on the one hand, the estimated betas associated with the short 
term (3, 6, 9 and 12 months ahead) are strongly significant and negative (with the 
exception of 𝛽9), which means that panelists construct destabilizing expectations. On the 
other hand, analyzing the long-term estimated sign for excellence reveals that 
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
  
22 
 
expectations are destabilizing. In this way, there is consistency between the short- and 
long-term predictions. 
 
Table 14: Expectation formation (real economic growth) 
 3-month ahead 6-month ahead 9-month ahead 12-month ahead 
 -0.5672 
(0.0000) 
-0.5793 
(0.0000) 
-0.6189 
(0.0000) 
-0.2958 
(0.0000) 
 
-2.0297 
 (0.0000) 
-2.6437 
(0.0000) 
-1.5561 
(0.0000) 
1.9166 
(0.0000) 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
No. of 
observations 
887 793 864 889 
Notes: p-values in parenthesis 
 
 15-month ahead 18-month ahead 21-month ahead 24-month ahead 
 -0.1551 
(0.0000) 
0.0162 
(0.6393) 
0.0359 
(0.2808) 
0.1752 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.4171 
(0.0179) 
0.0286 
(0.8097) 
-0.7152 
(0.0000) 
1.3267 
(0.0000) 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0179 0.8097 0.0000 0.0000 
No. of 
observations 
829 735 801 801 
Notes: p-values in parenthesis 
 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
Understanding how agents form expectations is at the centre of macroeconomic 
modelling. In this paper, we have contributed to the literature investigating the predictive 
ability and consistency properties of macroeconomic expectations using the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters conducted by the European central bank, offering further 
evidence on the explanatory power of expectations on inflation, unemployment rate and 
real economic growth, directly observed from survey data. 
Our results suggest that with respect to the headline inflation, both the RMSE and the 
Theil’s inequality coefficient indicate that economic agents make errors in their 
predictions and make it worse as we move away along the time horizon. At least up to 
k=12, most of the bias is concentrated on the covariance proportion, thus indicating that 
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
  
23 
 
ECB panellists make non-deterministic errors. We notice that respondents are able to 
predict with more accuracy core inflation than headline inflation. In both cases, our results 
provide sufficient empirical evidence to confirm that the predictions of these economic 
agents are better than those from a random walk. Rational expectations hypothesis is not 
fulfilled, but that the “weak form of rationality” is verified in any time horizon. Analys ing 
consistency of expectations, it is obtained that short-term expectations are consistent with 
long-term predictions. 
Regarding the expectations on unemployment rates, ECB participants form their 
predictions more accurate than those for the inflation rates, at least until to k=9. It is 
reflected that the mean and variance of the expectations carried out by the panellists do 
not differ from the mean and variance of the actually observed unemployment rates. In 
this case, predictions are biased and inefficient. In addition, there is enough empirica l 
evidence to allow us to reject the null hypothesis that short-term predictions are consistent 
with long-term expectations. 
As for the expectations on real GDP growth, unlike inflation rates or the unemployment 
rates, the RMSE decreases as we move forward in the time horizon, especially this decline 
is highly noticeable from 15 months ahead. In general panellists make non-determinis t ic 
errors when they are asked about the predictions for 15, 18, 21 and 24 months ahead. In 
this particular case, there is enough empirical evidence to assure the “weak form of 
rationality” of the predictions made by the ECB’s respondents. Besides short-term 
expectations are consistent with long-term predictions. 
Future research exploring the channels through which economic development affects 
ECB participants’ forecast performances would be very beneficial. 
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